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ADMIRALTY /MARITIME LAW
VESSEL OWNER'S RIGHT TO RELY ON
THE STEVEDORE TO PROTECT
LONGSHOREMEN FROM PRE-EXISTING
OBVIOUS· DANGERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
TAYLOR and OLLESTAD DECISIONS

Wayne F. Emard*

I. INTRODUCTION
Now over a dozen years ago, amendments to the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) beached the skow UNSEAWORTHINESS built by Sieracki, to launch a new vessel
for longshoreman recovery-the clipper REASONABLE CARE. Able crafters though they were, the
Shipbuilders of Capitol Hill were unwilling to
venture out on the waters of tort law and left the
REASONABLE CARE adrift in the doldrums of
vagueness, its destiny in the steady hands of its
nine Supreme Pilots and its energetic (but rarely
cohesive) Circuit and District crew. 'Through the
Straits of De Los Santos,' was the Pilot's terse
command. l

The crew of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently
• B.A. magna cum laude, Providence College 1976; J.D. cum laude University of
San Francisco School of Law 1982. Mr. Emard is an associate in the firm of Acret and
Perrochet, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.
1. Stass v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 720 F.2d 879, 880 (5th Cir. 1983). It is
initially noted that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was
amended in 1984, including Section 905(b). However, these amendments do not have a
significant bearing on this article.
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chartered the clipper REASONABLE CARE on two separate voyages
through the Straits of De Los Santos. 2 With Judge Anderson at
the helm in Taylor v. Moram Agencies,3 the court braved the
choppy seas created by tropical storms Subingsubing,· Davis/'
2. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) (hereinafter
cited as Scindia). In Scindia, three principles were enunciated. First, the vessel owner
must exercise ordinary care under the circumstances in turning over a vessel and equipment in such a condition that an expert stevedore can carryon its operation with reasonable safety. In discharging its duty, the owner is entitled to rely on the stevedore's performance of its task with reasonable care. Vessel owner must also warn the stevedore of
any hidden unsafe conditions on the ship of which the owner is, or should be, aware.
Second, once the stevedore begins its operations, the vessel owner has no duty to supervise its work or to inspect the area assigned to the stevedore, unless contract provision,
positive law, or custom impose such a duty. In short, the vessel owner has no general
duty to monitor the stevedore's operations, but is entitled to rely on the stevedore's expertise and reasonableness. This reliance, however, is not justified if some explicit duty is
recognized by the parties or imposed by law. Third, the vessel owner has a duty to protect the stevedore's employees during the stevedore's operations only if the owner becomes aware that the ship or its gear poses a danger to the stevedore's employees and
the owner learns that the stevedore is acting unreasonably in failing to protect its employees. The vessel owner is charged with knowledge of the defect if the danger develops
during the stevedore's operations and the owner has actual knowledge of it, or if the
danger exists at the outset, in which case the owner must be deemed to have knowledge.
Id. at 166-77.
3. Taylor v. Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J.; the
other panel members were Skopil, 0., and Ferguson, W., dissenting).
4. Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
Fletcher, B.B.; the other panel members were Pregerson, J., and Reinhardt, S.). In Subingsubing, a longshoreman was injured when he stepped on a small piece of wood, called
a "dead-eye," used to stop the steps of a rope ladder from moving. The issue was
whether the shipowner owed a duty of reasonable care to remove from the ship's deck,
before the longshoremen came aboard, a dangerous, non-obvious, tripping hazard. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that there was no duty
to inspect, discover, remedy, or warn of wood on the deck within the confines of the
stevedoring operation. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the issue in the instant
case was not whether the shipowner had a continuing duty to inspect and supervise the
operations of the stevedore, but whether the owner, in the exercise of the duty of reasonable care, should have removed the tripping hazard before the longshore worker came on
deck. The court noted that the vessel owed the longshore worker a duty that extended to
at least exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such a condition that an expert and experienced stevedore would be able, by the
exercise of reasonable care, to carryon its cargo operations with reasonable safety to
persons and property. Id. at 781-82.
5. Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. NORMANNIA, 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
Grant, R.A., sitting by designation; other panel members were Fletcher, B.B., and Ferguson, W.). In Davis, the longshoreman was struck by cargo being unloaded from the vessel
allegedly as a result of the dangerous proximity of the gangway to the unloading process.
The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff. The jury attributed
twenty percent comparative fault to the vessel, forty percent to the plaintiff and forty
percent to the stevedore. The judgment, however, was reduced only by the plaintiff's
negligence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since the gangway was under the
concurrent control of the vessel and stevedore, the vessel had a continuing duty to repo-
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and Turner 6 and, despite dissention by fellow crewmember Ferguson,7 sailed smoothly through the confines of the straits.

A second crew manned the REASONABLE CARE in Ollestad v.
Greenville Steamship Corp.,s in a subsequent attempt to negotiate the perilous Straits of De Los Santos with Circuit Judge
Fletcher as the helmsperson. Succumbing to the winds created
by Subingsubing,9 Turner,lo and Davis/ 1 the crew opted to
avoid the Straits and seek refuge in the Bay of Bueno. 12 While
the courage of that crew is admirable, they failed to comply with
sition it if safety required. Requiring the vessel to pay that portion of the judgment
attributable to the stevedore is in keeping with the LHWCA, which shields the stevedore
from contribution or indemnity. [d. at 1052·53.
6. Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the
other panel members were Ferguson, W., and Grant, R.A., sitting by designation). In
Turner, the vessel PRESIDENT QUEZON was owned by Philippine President Lines and was
time-chartered to Japan Lines, Ltd. The cargo of plywood was loaded by a Japanese
stevedore pursuant to a contract with the time-charterer. There was expert testimony
that the plywood was negligently and improperly stacked, as it was not shored properly.
The plaintiff longshoreman was seriously injured when a stack of lumber collapsed and
he was hit on the head. A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was overturned by the
district court when judgment N.O.V. was granted defendant. [d. at 1301-02. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that §905(b) does not bar the
shipowner from recovering against the foreign stevedore, only from recovering against
the employer, as defined in the Act. The vessel can ensure safety by chosing reliable
foreign stevedore, supervising its work when necessary, and warning the off-loading stevedore of concealed, dangerous conditions created by the foreign stevedore. The court
concluded that the vessel had a duty to protect plaintiff from concealed dangers created
by the foreign stevedore which the vessel could, in the exercise of reasonable care, have
corrected or warned of. [d. at 1302-04.
7. 739 F.2d 1384, 1389 (1984) (Ferguson, W., dissenting).
8. Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp., 738 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1984) (per
Fletcher, B.; the other panel members were Wright, E., and Anderson, J.).
9. 657 F.2d 1048.
10. 651 F.2d 1300. See also text accompanying note 6, supra.
11. 657 F.2d 1048. See also text accompanying note 5, supra.
l2. Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318 (9th Cir, 1982) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the
other panel members were Pregerson, J., and Reinhardt, S.). In Bueno, the plaintiff longshore worker, while re-entering the hold of a vessel, fell through a space left open after
the removal of scaffolding by a third-party sandblaster. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit in
admiralty against his employer, the United States, and the company which jointly contracted with plaintiff's employer to provide sandblasting services. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants and plaintiff appealed. [d. at 31819. The Ninth Circuit held that a factual issue existed as to whether the United States,
as vessel owner, was negligent in its failure to remedy a dangerous situation created by
the employer. The court noted that under Scindia, the United States, as vessel owner,
owed a duty of care to plaintiff, having assumed an affirmative duty to conduct periodic
safety inspections during the repairs. Because there were genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the United States breached that duty, summary judgment in favor of the
United States was inappropriate. [d. at 320-21.
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the Supreme Pilot's commands and truly test the seaworthiness
of the clipper REASONABLE CARE.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1927, Congress enacted the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,13 hereinafter referred to as
LHWCA. As originally framed, the Act established workers compensation as the longshoreman's exclusive remedy against a stevedore;a however, the Act made no specific provision for a
third-party tort action brought by a longshoreman against the
vessel owner. During the period prior to 1972, the Supreme
Court was left to fashion the form of recovery available to an
injured longshoreman against a vessel and its owner. In Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki/a the Court extended a cause of action
based upon unseaworthiness l8 to the longshoreman against the
vessel owner. Unseaworthiness is a form of strict liability which
had previously been reserved only to actions by seamen.
Ten years after Sieracki, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan
Atlantic Steamship Corp.,I? the Court held that a vessel owner
13. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, §§1-51, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended 33
U.S.C. §§905-51 (1984).
14. 33 U.S.C. §905 (1970), as amended; 33 U.S.C. §905 (1984).
15. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, Inc., 328 U.S. 85 (1946). In Sieracki, the court
extended to longshoremen the right given to seamen to recover against the shipowner,
without the need of establishing negligence, for injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of
the vessel. Sieracki was the employee of a stevedore and was injured when a shackle
supporting a boom broke. Plaintiff sued the shipowner and two other parties whose negligence he alleged caused his injury. The district court, Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57
F.Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944), found that the condition of the shackle rendered the vessel
unseaworthy; that there was no negligence on the part of the shipowner; that the two
third-party defendants were negligent; and that recovery should be had only against
those third parties. The court of appeals, Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3rd
Cir. 1945), accepted the findings on unseaworthiness and negligence made by the district
court, but concluded that Sieracki could recover against the shipowner on the ground of
unseaworthiness, irrespective of the latter's lack of fault. Five justices of the Supreme
Court approved the position taken by the court of appeals and affirmed Sieracki's
recovery.
16. The warranty of seaworthiness was extended to seamen because of the special
hazards of their work, the rigorous discipline to which they were subjected, and the'special protection traditionally accorded them by admiralty courts. Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). Since longshoremen were not considered "seamen," they did
not have the benefit of the warranty of seaworthiness. However, they could bring an
action against the shipowner for negligence, a remedy that was not available to seamen.
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
17. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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could seek indemnity from the stevedore employer based upon a
breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike performance!'
Thus evolved the so-called Sieracki-Ryan I9 doctrine, effectively
negating the stevedore's exclusive liability under former §905 of
the LHWCA. The doctrine provided a circuitous action whereby
the injured longshoreman recovered from the vessel owner, who
could then obtain indemnity fr'om the longshoreman's employer,
the stevedore, who was statutorily liable for payment of
compensation. 20
In 1972, Congress responded to the Sieracki-Ryan dilemma
and made a number of significant changes in the LHWCA
through enactment of long-awaited amendments. 21 Among other
things, the LHWCA Amendments broadened the scope of coverage while increasing compensation benefits. 22 A third-party ac18. In Ryan, the court was faced with the question of whether a shipowner, who was
forced to pay damages to a longshoreman injured by the unsafe storage of cargo, could
recover indemnity from the stevedoring company for whom the longshoreman worked.
Even in the absence of any indemnity provision, the court held that the stevedoring
company was liable to the shipowner because it had promised to store the cargo safely.
The court was not convinced by arguments that its result made the economic burden of
the longshoreman's recovery fall on the stevedoring employer contrary to the purpose of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. Section 5 of the Act, before its present
amendment, provided that the liability of an employer would be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the employee and its legal representatives and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer at law or in admiralty
on account of injury or death. The exception was where an employer had failed to secure
the payment of compensation, in which event the person concerned could elect to claim
compensation either under the Act or by way of a separate suit. Id. at 128-29.
19. The Sieracki-Ryan doctrine deprived the stevedore of its immunity from civil
suit for damages stemming from the personal injury of its employees. Since the Sieracki
doctrine of unseaworthiness was very broad, few injuries were outside its scope, and the
federal courts were flooded with longshoremen's injury actions. See Deacon, The Injured
Longshoreman v. The Shipowner, 28 HASTINGS L.J., 771, 776 (1977).
20.Id.
21. Among Congress' primary goals in amending the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act in 1972 were the improvement of the Act's benefit structure
and the general safety of prevailing working conditions. See H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7, (1972) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report], which states:
Permitting actions against the vessel based on negligence will
meet the objective of encouraging safety because the vessel
will still be required to exercise the same care as a land-based
person in providing a safe place to work. Thus, nothing in this
Bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsibility to
take appropriate corrective action where it knows or should
have known about a dangerous condition.
Id.
22. See Committee Report, Id. at 2-3.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 5

6

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

tion against a negligent "vessel" was created by the addition of
subsection (b) to § 905, and the unseaworthiness remedy, with
respect to longshoremen, was nullified. 23
As originally intended, the trade-off was a fair one. The injured longshoreman received tax free benefits which often
equaled or exceeded pre-injury take-home pay.24 The benefits
were based on double the national average weekly wage with annual unlimited tax-free escalation. 2tl The vessel interests were
denied their indemnity action against the stevedore in exchange
for the elimination of a longshoreman's recovery based upon the
doctrine of unseaworthiness. 26 The stevedore regained its insulation from what was, in effect, the longshoreman's tort recovery
against it.27
23. 33 U.S.C. §905(b) (1984). The first sentence of §905(b) permits longshoremen
and harbor workers to sue the vessel for negligence. The section states:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter
caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof,
may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in
accordance with the provisions of §933 of this Title, and the
employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages
directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
contrary shall be void.
[d.
33 U.S.C. §902(21) (1984), defines the term "vessel," as follows:
The term vessel means any vessel upon which or in connection
with which any person entitled to benefits under this Chapter
suffers injury or death arising out of or in the course of his
employment, and said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice,
agent, operator, charterer, or bareboat charterer, master, officer, or crew member.
The last clause of §905(b) not only abolishes the Ryan implied warranty of workmanlike performance, but also provides that an employer cannot be held liable "directly
or indirectly" for its employee's injuries. Contractual clauses purporting to shift this liability to the employer will be null and void. In the second and third sentences of §905(b),
Congress appears to have overruled Reed v. The YAKA, 373 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1963). See
GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 444-45 (2d ed. 1975). [Hereinafter cited as
GILMORE & BLACK.) The fourth sentence of §905(b) overrules Sieracki, and the last sentence prevents the development of a new strict liability theory by making negligence the
exclusive basis for recovery against the shipowner.
For a general review of the amendments, see Gorman, The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act-Alter the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARITIME L. &
COMM., 1 (1974).
24. The compensation scheme, at a minimum, was double the compensation payments to most covered employees. See Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 3.
25. 33 U.S.C. §906(b) (1984).
26. See Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 4-8.
27. 33 U.S.C. §905(a) (1984).
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Since §905(b) of the LHWCA does not define the standard
of care which Congress intended vessels to exercise toward longshoremen,28 numerous courts have taken various approaches in
defining the vessel owner's standard of care and in interpreting
the legislative history of the 1972 amendments with respect to
open and obvious dangers on board the vessel.29 The Court of
Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits relied upon
§§343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 30 in defin28. Section 905(b) merely provides the broad outlines of the third-party action, and
it must be read in conjunction with the legislative history in order to discern congressional intent as to the applicable standard of care. The House Report sought a compromise position and rejected both proposals by the shipping industry that a third-party
action by totally abolished and the longshoremen's proposal that the strict liability remedy be continued. See Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 4-5. The congressional reports reject the assumption that longshoremen encounter seamen's hazards and therefore
should have seamen's remedies. [d. at 5-6. For example, in International Stevedoring Co.
v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926), the Supreme Court extended the Jones Act remedy, 48
U.S.C. §688 (1970), to longshoremen by holding that for purposes of the Jones Act, longshoremen were seamen. In response to the Haverty decision, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act within 6 months. See Act of Mar. 4,
1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, §§1-51, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§901-51 (1984).
29. Congress, in failing to provide an adequate definition of negligence, left the
courts the task of fashioning a uniform standard for determining the scope of the shipowner's duty of care towards longshoremen. As a result, a clear philosophical split arose
among the circuits. For example, in Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2nd Cir,
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1980), the Second Circuit stated that it would continue
to adhere to the view that §343(a) of the Restatement (SECOND) of Torts was the appropriate standard for determining negligence under §905(b). That standard is that a vessel
is not liable for injuries resulting from known or obvious dangers unless shipowner
should anticipate the harm, despite the obviousness of the danger. See also Evans v.
Transportation Maritima Mexicana, S.S., 639 F.2d 848, 855 (2nd Cir, 1981). The Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, relying primarily on the legislative history of the Act, also consistently applied land-based principles of negligence as embodied in the Restatement (SECOND) of Torts, §§343, 343A. See Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757,
759 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Dunlap v. G. & C. Towing, Inc., 613 F.2d 493 (4th Cir.
1980), Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978), Gay v. Ocean Transport &
Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977), and Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corporation, 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977). However, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits
took the position that the shipowner's conduct could only be judged through the application of maritime principles of negligence. See Johnson v. AlS Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d
334, 347 (1st Cir. 1980), Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburg Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116 (3rd Cir.
1979), Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979), Lawson v.
United States, 605 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1979).
30. The Restatement sections state:
§343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by
Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an un-
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ing the standard of care. 31 The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits,
however, held that these sections should not apply in §905(b)
suits, since they might bar a longshoreman from recovery if he
was contributorily negligent, or if he voluntarily encountered a
known or obvious risk, defenses which are not cognizable in
admiralty. 32
Finally, in 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States
grappled with this issue in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v.. De
Los Santos. 33 In Scindia, a longshoreman was injured when
sacks of wheat fell from a pallet being lowered into a cargo hold
by a longshoreman operating a ship's winch. The braking mechanism of the winch had been malfunctioning for two days prior
to the longshoreman's injury. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington 34 granted summary judgment for the vessel, holding that, under the negligence standards
governing actions under §905(b), a shipowner is not liable for
dangerous conditions created by the stevedore's negligence while
the stevedore is in exclusive control of the manner and the area
of work, and the shipowner has no duty to warn the stevedore or
its employees of open and obvious defects. 311
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed,38 holding that a shipowner may be subject to liability
reasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.
§343 A. Known or Obvious Dangers
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land
whose danger is known or obvious to them unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. (2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that
the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating
that the harm should be anticipated.
31. [d.
32. [d.

33.
34.
1976).
35.
36.

451 U.S. 156 (1981).
De Los Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 1976 AMC 2583 (W.O. Wash.
[d. at 2585.
Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
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if it knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care should discover, a defective condition on the vessel which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen and fails to exercise
reasonable care to protect the longshoremen against the
danger,3?
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's view of vessel liability and
established a framework within which to determine the standard
of care owed by the vessel owner to longshoremen, particularly
with regard to open and obvious dangers arising during the
cargo operation,38 The court adopted the standard established in
Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co. 3S with respect to
obvious dangers existing prior to turning the vessel over to the
stevedore,40 It stated that the Restatement rule,n while relevant,
Duniway, B.C.; the other panel members were Choy, H., and Grant, R.A., sitting by
designation).
37. ld. at 485.
38. The Court summarized the vessel's duty once the independent contractor has
begun operations:
We are of the view that absent contract provision, positive
law, or custom to the contrary-none of which has been cited
to us in this case-the shipowner has no general duty by way
of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of
the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore. The
necessary consequence is that the shipowner is not liable to
the longshoreman for injuries caused by dangers unknown to
the. owner and about which he had no duty to inform himself.
This conclusion is plainly consistent with the congressional intent to foreclose the faultless liability of the shipowner based
on a theory of unseaworthiness or non-delegable duty. The
shipowner, within limits, is entitled to rely on the stevedore,
and owes no duty to the longshoremen to inspect or supervise
cargo operations.
451 U.S. at 172.
The court further noted that:
As a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore
to avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards.
Section 41 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §941, requires the stevedore,
the longshoreman's employer, to provide a 'reasonably safe
place to work' and to take such safeguards with respect to
equipment and working conditions as the Secretary of Labor
may determine to be necessary to avoid injury to longshoremen. The ship is not the common employer of the longshoremen and owes no such statutory duty to them.
ld. at 170.
39. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
40. The court stated:
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was not controlling in establishing the shipowner's duty to longshoremen, at least under the facts of that case. 42 The court also
recognized, and both parties agreed, that a vessel owner may
subject itself to additional liability if it actively "involves" itself
in the cargo operations and negligently injures a longshoreman,
or if it fails to exercise due care in protecting longshoremen from
hazards they may encounter in areas under the "active" control
of the vessel owner. 43
The Supreme Court held that there was a triable issue of
fact in Scindia on whether the shipowner had actual knowledge
of the failure of the winch's braking mechanism or could be
charged with knowledge because the winch was defective from
the outset. If Scindia was aware that the winch was malfunctioning to some degree, and if there was a jury question as to
whether it was so unsafe that the stevedore decision to continue
using it was "obviously improvident," then the jury could have
found that the vessel owner should have intervened and stopped
the loading operation until the winch was repaired. 44
[T]he vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care 'under the circumstances.' This duty extends at least to exercising ordinary care
under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in
such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will
be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carryon its cargo
operations with reasonable safety to persons and property,
and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or
with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or
should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that
would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of
his cargo operations and that are not known to the stevedore
and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work ... The shipowner thus has a duty with respect to the condition of the
ship's gear, equipment, tools, and work space to be used in the
stevedore operations; and if he fails at least to warn the stevedore of hidden danger which would have been known to him
in the exercise of reasonable care, he has breached his duty
and is liable if his negligence causes injury to the
longshoreman.
451 U.S. at 167.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343, §343(a).
42. 451 U.S. at 168, n.14.
43. [d. at 167.
44. The court articulated the standard for the existence of a dangerous condition
during stevedoring operations where such condition is known to the stevedore and may
cause injury to its longshoremen. The court stated that the duty, within the framework
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell (joined by Justice
Rehnquist) emphasized the distinction between the Supreme
Court's approach and the "general reasonableness" standard
adopted by the Ninth Circuit.4Ii In doing so, Justice Powell highlighted that portion of the opinion establishing the vessel's limited duty with respect to obvious hazards of which it is aware.
The vessel owner, according to Justice Powell, need only act reasonably in relying on the stevedore to discover and avoid obvious hazards on the vessel. This standard promotes safety by
placing responsibility on the party best able to protect the
longshoremen. 48
Since Scindia, the Ninth Circuit has had occasion to apply
this case in at least six reported longshore decisions. 47 Various
of the case was:
[W]hether [the winch] could be safely used or whether it
posed an unreasonable risk of harm to Santos or other longshoremen was a matter of judgment committed to the stevedore in the first instance ... Yet it is quite possible, it seems
to us, that the stevedore's judgment was so obviously improvident that (the vessel) if it knew of this defect and that (the
stevedore) was continuing to use it, should have realized the
winch presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen, and that in such circumstances it had a duty to intervene and repair the ship's winch. The same would be true if
the defect existed from the outset and (the vessel) must be
deemed to have been aware of its condition.
[d. at 175-76.
45. [d. at 181 (Powell, concurring).
46. Justice Powell stated:
The difficulty with a more general reasonableness standard
like that adopted by the court below is that it fails to deal
with the problems of allocating responsibility between the stevedore and the shipowner. It may be that it is 'reasonable' for
a shipowner to rely on the stevedore to discover and avoid
most obvious hazards. But when, in a suit by a longshoreman,
a jury is presented with the single question whether it was
'reasonable' for the shipowner to fail to take action concerning
a particular obvious hazard, the jury will be quite likely to find
liability. If such an outcome were to become the norm, negligent stevedores would be receiving windfall recoveries in the
form of reimbursement for the statutory benefit payments to
the injured longshoreman. (Footnote omitted.) This would decrease significantly the incentives toward safety of the party in
the best position to prevent injuries, and undercut the primary responsibility of that party for ensuring safety.
[d.
47. See, for example, Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981),
Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982). These cases,
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panels of the Ninth Circuit have issued opinions which appear
divergent with respect to the vessel owner's standard of care in
longshore claims.'8 Except for the Bandeen case,49 the other five
reported decisions have tended toward broadening the duty of
care set out in Scindia."o Not surprisingly, one circuit judge auwhile imposing a duty to warn on the shipowner, would require a warning only in regard
to hidden (Turner) or non-obvious (Subingsubing) dangers. See also Davis v.
Partenreederei M.S. NORMANNIA, 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981) (longshoreman injured by
cargo discharged in close proximity to gangway held to have action for negligence based
on shipowner's concurrent control of the gangway); Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318
(9th Cir. 1982) (shipowner assumed affirmative duty by conducting regular safety inspections and should have noted and corrected danger created by a third-party sandblaster).
Hedrick v. Pine Oak Shipping, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983) (defective splice in vang
pendant caused injury to longshoreman, jury question existed as to whether inspection
by shipowner would have revealed defect prior to turning vessel over to stevedore); Bandeen v. United Carriers, 712 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1983) (vessel owner held not liable where
longshoreman was injured due to stevedore's failure to provide safety lines).
48. The panels of each post-Scindia decision are as follows:
Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. NORMANNIA, 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
Grant, R.A., sitting by designation; the other panel members were Fletcher, B.B., and
Ferguson, W.);
Turner v. Japan Lines, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the other
panel members were Ferguson, W., and Grant, R.A., sitting by designation);
Hedrick v. Pine Oaks Shipping, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.;
the other panel members were Pregerson, H., and Canby, W.);
Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the other
panel members were Pregerson, H., and Reinhardt, S.);
Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
Fletcher, B.B.; the other panel members were Pregerson, H., and Reinhardt, S.);
Bandeen v. United Carriers, 712 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.; the
other panel members were Canby, W., and Pregerson, H., dissenting);
Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp, 738 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Fletcher,
B.B.; the other panel members were Wright, E., and Anderson, J.);
Taylor v. Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J.B.; the
other panel members were Skopil, 0., and Ferguson, W., dissenting);
49. Bandeen v. United Carriers, 712 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.;
the other panel members were Canby, W., and Pregerson, H., dissenting). In Bandeen, a
longshoreman was injured when he fell from a vessel while loading logs on deck. He
alleged that defendants were negligent in not providing safety wires between stanchions.
The district court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict on the ground that the
stevedore is solely responsible for the longshoreman's safety. [d. at 1338-39. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the vessel owner had neither the duty to string safety lines
nor the duty to intervene when the stevedore failed to do so. [d. at 1340. The dissent
(Pregerson) emphasized that a vessel owner has a duty to intervene when the stevedore's
conduct is obviously improvident and that a jury could have so found. [d. at 1341.
50. See, text accompanying notes 6, 7, 8, 14 supra. In Hedrick v. Pine Oaks Shipping, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.; the other panel members were
Pregerson, H., and Canby, W.), a longshoreman was injured by a defective splice in a
vang pendant (part of the ship's equipment). The trial court granted judgment N.O.V. to
defendant shipowner, based on the lack of evidence showing knowledge of the defect by
shipowner. [d. at 1356. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a shipowner has a
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thored the majority opinion in three of those five cases, and she
sat on the panel of one other:H Two other judges, alone or in
tandem, were on the panels of all five and one submitted a dissenting opinion in Bandeen. 1I2
It is within this framework that the Taylor and Ollestad
cases came to the fore. Analysis of both decisions is Hlustrative
of the divergent views in this Circuit regarding the vessel
owner's standard of care.

III. THE TAYLOR AND OLLESTAD DECISIONS

A.

Taylor v. Moram Agencies

In Taylor v. Moram Agencies,1I3 a longshoreman, was injured on board the MN NIKOLAY KARAMZIN owned by Far Eastern Steamship Company (FESCO) while that vessel was discharging cargo. Plaintiff alleged that he slipped on beans which
had spilled on deck during the unloading process and sustained
personal injuries. 1I4 This action was subsequently brought
against the vessel owner FESCO and its agent under §905(b) of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, as
amended in 1972. 1111
Plaintiff contended that FESCO breached its duty to provide a vessel and equipment in reasonably safe condition, given
the presence of the torn sacks of mung beans, before cargo operduty to inspect its equipment before turning it over to the stevedore and a jury question
existed whether a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defective splice. [d. at
1357.
51. Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher authored Turner, Subingsubing, and Bueno, and
she sat on the panel in Davis.
52. Circuit Judge J: Pregerson sat on the panel in Hedrick, Bueno, Subingsubing,
and Bandeen (dissenting); Circuit Judge w. J. Ferguson sat on the panel in Davis and
Turner. It should be noted also, that Circuit Judge S. Reinhardt participated on the
panels of Bueno and Subingsubing.
53. 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J.B.; the other panel members were
Skopil, 0., and Ferguson, W., dissenting).
54. A portion of the cargo consisted of sacks of mung beans from Bangkok, which
are hard, round, green beans the size of BB's. Some of the sacks were torn and leaking
beans before the unloading operation began. As these sacks were hoisted out of the hold,
beans spilled onto the main deck and were tracked around the vessel. Apparently, some
of the beans were blown up onto the steel deck of the winch platform. On the morning of
the second day of cargo unloading by the stevedore, Crescent Wharf and Warehouse,
plaintiff lost his footing on the winch platform while taking the slack out of the midship
guy wire, slipped on the beans and fell on his back and head. [d. at 1387.
55. See text accompanying note 23, supra.
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ations began. Further, plaintiff alleged that FESCO assumed exclusive or concurrent control of the winch platform where the
accident occurred by performing maintenance on the winch and
by sweeping the deck during the cargo operation. By exercising
such control, it was asserted that FESCO assumed additional
duties with respect to these areas. Lastly, plaintiff contended
that FESCO had knowledge of the presence of the dangerous
condition on the winch platform, and had an obligation to intervene in the cargo operation to correct it.
In a bench trial, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California (William W. Schwarzer presiding) entered judgment in favor of defendant FESCO, concluding
that the vessel owner complied with its responsibility to provide
a vessel and equipment in reasonably safe condition and that
there was no hidden danger of which the shipowner had a duty
to warn the stevedore of. The trial court further held that the
shipowner had not assumed exclusive or concurrent control of
the platform where the accident occurred and had no duty to
intervene in the cargo discharge operation.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court judgment, holding that the findings of fact rendered by the trial court were not
"clearly erroneous" and that the lower court applied the proper
standard of care applicable in its judgment for the shipowner.
The court held that the torn sacks of beans lying in the hold
posed no threat to the longshoremen and that it was not the
torn sacks, but the stevedore's failure to take appropriate precautions, that created the danger. liS Distinguishing the Turner
and Subingsubing decisions, the court emphasized the obviousness of the damaged sacks of beans and the fact, well known
56. The court stated:
The torn sacks of beans lying in the hold posed no threat; it
was only when the cargo discharge began and the wind blew
the leaking beans onto the deck and winch platform that a
hazardous condition developed. Thus, it was not the torn
sacks but the stevedore's subsequent failure to take appropriate precautions in the course of the operation that created the
danger. Under the provisions of Scindia, a shipowner who has
turned over a safe vessel and equipment has the right to rely
on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoreman to
hazards which develop within the confines of the cargo
operation.
739 F.2d at 1386.
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to the stevedore, that loose beans cause longshoremen to fall. 67
Having turned over a safe vessel and equipment, FESCO had
the right to rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing longshoremen to the hazards of spilled beans. 68
Recognizing that a vessel's active involvement in the cargo
operation could expose the vessel owner to increased liability,69
the court held that the winch maintenance and sweeping of
mung beans performed by the vessel's crew during cargo discharge were insufficient to create the type of involvement or control necessary to burden the owner with additional responsibilities toward the longshoremen. so The court further acknowledged
that while primary responsibility for maintaining safe conditions
during cargo operations rested with the stevedore, a limited exception exists which might require a vessel owner to intervene to
correct a dangerous condition. s1 Here, however, the court held
that even assuming FESCO's knowledge of the loose beans on
the winch platform, there was no duty to intervene and sweep
up the beans, since FESCO could reasonably expect the stevedore to do what was necessary to protect the longshoremen. 82
Neither the stevedore's contract nor the Chief Mate's agreement
57. The court stated:
Here, the damaged condition of the sacks was obvious to the
stevedore when the hatch was opened. The difficulty with this
type of cargo was well known to the experienced stevedore
personnel . . . It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court
to have found no hidden danger of which the shipowner had a
duty to warn in the face of the evidence demonstrating that
the stevedores were well aware of this particular problem and
of the difficulties which were expected in cargo operations of
this type.
739 F.2d at 1387.
58. Id. at 1386.
59. Id. at 1387.
60. The court stated: "The active control over the area or equipment utilized in the
cargo operation is distinct from the casual use of the deck by the ship's crew for passage
or activities undertaken by the crew at the specific request of stevedore personnel." Id.
61. The exception was specified in Scindia and the court stated it as follows:
An exception to this rule is recognized where a shipowner (1)
has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition,
(2) knows that the longshoremen are continuing to work despite the existence of an unreasonable risk of harm to them,
and (3) could not reasonably expect that the stevedore would
remedy the situation. (Citations omitted)
Id. at 1387-88.
62. Testimony revealed that bean spillage during this type of operation was normal.
Id. at 1388.
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to take care of the problem was sufficient basis for the court to
find shipowner liability.6s
Circuit Judge Ferguson filed a dissenting OpInIOn, which
criticized the lower court for applying an incorrect legal standard in analyzing the facts.6. The dissent viewed the facts as
compelling a conclusion that FESCO had expressly assumed the
duty of eliminating the hazard created by the loose beans and
that the stevedore fulfilled its duty to maintain a safe environment when it reported the condition to the ship's mate. 611 Judge
Ferguson concluded that finding FESCO not negligent was
clearly erroneous. 66
B.

Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp.

In Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp.,67 plaintiff injured his leg while working as a longshoreman on board defendant's vessel, the GREENFIELD. The longshoremen were engaged
to load lumber on the vessel. Before the longshoremen came on
board, however, the ship's crew removed the hatch covers and
stacked them on the weather deck. They also left a boom rest68
lying on the deck. The placement of the hatch covers and boom
rest made it necessary for workers crossing the weather deck to
either climb over the hatch covers or boom rest, or slide under
the boom rest in order to get by.69 Ollestad stepped on the boom
63. With respect to the mate's promise to clean up the beans, the court stated:
We find that by sweeping the deck, without it being made
clear that he was also asked to clean the winch platform, the
mate fulfilled any responsibility the vessel assumed by reason
of the promise ... By assuming the responsibility for cleaning
up the original spillage on the deck, the vessel will not be obligated to a continuous duty to clean up additional spillage resulting from the stevedore's failure to properly discharge the
cargo.
[d.
64. [d. at 1389.
65. [d. at 1391.
66. [d. at 1393.

67. Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp., 738 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1984) (per
Fletcher, B.B.; the other panel members were Wright, E., and Anderson, J.).
68. A boom rest is used to support the boom of the vessel when not in use. [d. at
1050.
69. During the first day of loading, snow and ice built up on the deck creating a
slippery condition. The plaintiff had crossed the weather deck several times during the
morning, passing over the objects obstructing the passageway; however, after lunch,
plaintiff stepped on the boom rest, slipped and fell, causing his leg injury. [d.
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rest, slipped and fell, causing his leg injury.
Ollestad filed an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska against the vessel owners, alleging negligence pursuant to §905(b) of the Longshoremen and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act, as amended in 1972. 70 Plaintiff alleged that the shipowners were negligent both in positioning the
hatch covers in a manner that left an inadequate passageway
and in allowing the boom rest to obstruct that passageway.
The jury found negligence on the part of the shipowner in
creating the conditions on the weather deck, and the trial court
entered judgment accordingly. Defendants appealed the judgment, contending that the instructions given to the jury were
erroneous in that they misstated the conditions under which an
owner may be liable and that an owner has no duty to comply
with Occupational Safety and Health Administration Longshoring Regulations. 71
70. See note 23 and accompanying text, supra.
71. The trial court, over defendant's objection, gave the jury the following
instructions:
A shipowner has no duty to inspect or to supervise cargo loading or unloading operations under the direction of a stevedore
company, since it is by law the responsibility of the stevedore
to provide longshoremen with a reasonably safe place to work,
reasonably safe equipment and safe working conditions.
A shipowner is liable to longshoremen for injuries caused by
an unreasonable risk created by him or known by him or
which should have been known by him which existed at the
time the vessel was turned over to the stevedore for cargo operations. A shipowner is also liable to the longshoremen for
injuries caused by an unreasonable risk of harm existing
within work areas remaining under the direct control of the
shipowner or by reason of a danger creating an unreasonable
risk of harm which is known to the shipowner which the shipowner could not reasonably assume would be remedied by the
stevedore but was within the power and control of the shipowner to remedy.
In your consideration of whether a danger creating an unreasonable risk of harm to longshoremen existed at the time the
shipowner turned over the vessel GREENFIELD to the stevedore
for cargo loading or unloading operations, you may consider
the following regulation as evidence along with all the other
evidence on plaintiff's claims of negligence. 'Dunnage, hatch
beams, tarplins, or gear not in use shall be stowed no closer
than 3 feet to the port and starboard sides of the weather deck
hatch coaming, except that a reasonable tolerance shall be
permited where strict adherence is rendered impracticable due
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the instructions given by the district court were proper, in light of the uncontested facts of the case. 72 While skirting the issue concerning
the obviousness of the danger,73 the court relied upon the fact
that the ship's crew created the obstruction or the "risk" and
that because placement of the hatch covers is work normally
done by longshoremen, the ship's crew assumed the duty to exercise the same standard of care required of a stevedore. 74 In
upholding the OSHA jury instruction, the court further held
that these safety standards, normally applicable to the stevedore, imposed additional duties upon a vessel which undertakes
work normally performed by longshoremen and are relevant in
determining whether the shipowner exercised reasonable care.7CI
to the circumstances.'
738 F.2d at 1050-52
The trial court rejected defendant's proposed instruction which read in part:
If you find that the hazardous condition was open and obvious, and that it existed before control of the ship was handed
over to the stevedore, the defendants had a duty to remedy
the condition only if they had a reasonable belief that the stevedore would not remedy the hazard and that the condition
presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff.
[d. at 1051.
72. [d. at 1052.
73. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit has not decided whether the shipowner's
knowledge or creation of an obvious dangerous condition that exists at the time the ship
is turned over to longshoremen is, without more, sufficient to establish liability. See,
Turner, 651 F.2d at 1304-05, (evidence sufficient to establish shipowner's liability to the
longshoremen unloading cargo where crew should have known of dangerous, non-obvious
condition created by foreign stevedore during loading). Davis, 657 F.2d at 1052-53, (evidence sufficient to establish shipowner's liability where ship's crew had placed gangway
in dangerous position, had a continuing responsibility to correct its position, and was
aware of the danger); Subingsubing, 682 F.2d at 782, (shipowner had duty of reasonable
care to remove non-obvious tripping hazard before longshoremen come on board).
74. The court stated:
The "risk" referred to in the challenged instruction was the
obstruction of the weather deck caused by the position of the
hatch covers and boom rest. This risk was undisputedly created by the ship in the course of doing work normally done by
longshoremen. In doing such work, the ship's crew had the
duty to exercise the same reasonable care required of a stevedore to protect workers who would be continuing longshore
operations on board. (Citing Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d
at 320)
738 F.2d at 1052.
75. [d. at 1053.
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CRITIQUE

In Scindia, the Supreme Court of the United States clearly
established the duty that a vessel owner owes to longshoremen
with respect to open and obvious dangers existing prior to the
commencement of cargo operations. The court adopted the standard of care approved in Marine Terminals v. Burnside,?6 which
essentially is the implied contractual duty owed by a vessel
owner to the stevedore. Ironically, the duty adopted by the Supreme Court was enunciated by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California in Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International.??
The district court in that case established that the shipowner owed a stevedore the following duty:
(1) To exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to place the ship on which the stevedore
work is to be done, and the equipment and appliances aboard ship, in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore contractor, mindful of the dangers he should reasonably expect to
encounter, arising from the hazards of the ship's
service or otherwise, will be able, by the exercise
of ordinary care under the circumstances, to load
or discharge the cargo, as the case may be, in a
workmanlike manner and with reasonable safety
to persons and property; and (2) To give the
stevedoring contractor reasonable warning of the
existence of any latent or hidden danger which
has not been remedied and is not usually encountered or reasonably to be expected by an expert
and experienced stevedoring company in the performance of the stevedoring work aboard the ship,
if the shipowner actually knows or, in the exercise
of ordinary care under the circumstances, should
know of the existence of such danger, and the
danger is one which the shipowner should reasonably expect a stevedoring contractor to encounter
in the performance of the stevedoring contract.'s
76. 394 U.S. 404 (1969). In Marine Terminals, the Supreme Court analyzed the
duty owed to a stevedore by a vessel owner.
77. 170 F.Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
78. Id. at 610-11. That court indicated that these obligations also constituted the
"duty of ordinary care imposed by law toward persons rightfully transacting business on
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In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court has established that the contractual obligations set forth in Hugev constitute the duty of ordinary care owed by the shipowner to the stevedore and longshoreman with respect to dangers existing when
the vessel is turned over to the stevedore. 79 In so doing, the Supreme Court has limited the longshoreman's recovery against a
vessel owner for injuries resulting from hazards which are obvious to the stevedore or which the stevedore should reasonably
expect to encounter only to those situations where the stevedore
is acting in an "obviously improvident" manner with respect to
those hazards. 80
As described by Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in
Scindia,81 there is a good reason why this standard, on its face,
is seemingly easy on shipowners and unjust to the longshoreman. He states:
Under 33 U.S.C. §905(b), the shipowner is liable
ships." Id. at 610.
79. The Supreme Court, in Scindia, further stated:
Furthermore . . . the stevedore normally warrants to discharge his duties in a workmanlike manner; and although the
1972 Amendments relieved the stevedore of his duty to indemnify the shipowner for damages paid to the longshoreman for
injuries caused by the stevedore's breach of warranty, they did
not otherwise disturb the contractual undertaking of the stevedore nor the rightful expectation of the vessel that the stevedore would perform his task properly without supervision
by the ship. (emphasis added)
451 U.S. 170.
SO. In Scindia, the court stated:
The malfunctioning being obvious and Seattle having continued to use it, Scindia submits that if it was aware of the condition or was charged with the knowledge of it, it was nevertheless entitled to assume that Seattle, the specialist in loading
and unloading, considered the equipment reasonably safe and
was entitled to rely upon that judgment.
Yet, it is quite possible ... that Seattle's judgment in this
respect was so obviously improvident that Scindia, if it knew
of the defect and that Seattle was continuing to use it, should
have realized the winch presented an unreasonable risk of
harm to the longshoremen and that in such circumstance it
had a duty to intervene and repair the ship's winch. The same
would be true if the defect existed from the outset and
Scindia must be deemed to have been aware of its condition.
(emphasis added)
Id. at 176.
81. ld. at 180 (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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in damages to the longshoreman if it was negligent, and it may not seek to recover any part of
this liability from the stevedore. The longshoreman's recovery is not reduced to reflect the negligence of the stevedore. (Citations omitted) The
stevedore-even if concurrently negligent-receives reimbursement for its statutory
benefit payments to the longshoreman, up to the
full amount of those payments. (Citations omitted) As a result of this automatic reimbursement,
there is a danger that 'concurrently negligent
stevedores will be insulated from the obligation to
pay statutory workman's compensation benefits,
and thus will have inadequate incentives to provide a safe working environment for their employees.' (Citations omitted) In cases involving obvious and avoidable hazards, this danger will be
realized unless the shipowner's liability is limited
to the unusual case in which it should be anticipated that the stevedore will fail to act reasonably. Any more stringent, or less defined, rule of
shipowner liability will skew the statutory scheme
in a way Congress could not have intended. (Citations omitted)82

In practice, the stevedore's compensation insurance carrier
notices a lien in any action brought by a longshoreman against a
vessel for injuries. The lien is usually in an amount equal to the
total amount of compensation and medical payments made. If
the longshoreman prevails, the award is reduced by the costs
and attorney's fees incurred in bringing the action. 8s The compensation carrier extracts its entire lien amount from the award
(regardless of any amount of stevedore negligence) and the longshoreman receives whatever is left. It is obvious that the compensation carriers are the entities who benefit most from a liberal interpretation of the vessel owners' standard of care. They
receive insurance premiums from the stevedore, as well as prob82. Jd. at 183, n. 2.

83. An attempt by a longshoreman to compel participation by the stevedore in his
litigation expenses failed in Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 445 U.S. 74
(1980). The court held that the LHWCA and its legislative history did not provide for
the reduction of the stevedore's lien by a percentage of the litigation expenses. To do so
would be to impose a type of liability on the stevedore barred by the exclusive remedy
provisions of that Act. Jd. at 85.
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able total recoupment of benefits, without having to incur attorney's fees.
The responsibility for providing a safe work place is and always has been with the stevedore.8• As Justice Powell states in
his concurring opinion, the vessel owner should only be liable in
those unusual cases where it should be anticipated that the stevedore will fail to act reasonably. The focus in any analysis
should be upon whether the shipowner could reasonably expect
that an expert and experienced stevedore would not or could not
provide a safe work environment for the longshoremen despite
the alleged danger.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) regulations pertaining to the longshoring industry,85
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, established the stevedore's duties with respect to the safety of longshoremen. 88 These
safety regulations impress upon the stevedore a statutory standard of care upon which the vessel owner can reasonably rely.87
Compliance is mandatory.88
A review of the Ninth Circuit cases dealing with the shipowner's duty of care to longshoremen indicates that certain
panels of this circuit have failed to fully comprehend the practical realities described by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Scindia. 89 Ollestad is the most recent example of the
84. 33 U.S.C. §941(a) states in relevant part:
Every employer shall furnish and maintain employment and
places of employment which shall be reasonably safe for his
employees in all employments covered by this chapter and
shall install, furnish, maintain, and use such devices and safeguards with particular reference used by and working conditions established by such employers as the Secretary may determine by regulation or order to be reasonably necessary to
protect the life, health and safety of such employees, and to
render safe such employment and places of employment, and
to prevent injury to his employees.
85. Safety And Health Regulations For Longshoring. 29 C.F.R. §1918 (1984).
86. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 176.
87. ld. at 170.
88. 29 C.F.R. §191O.16, states in relevant part: Each employer shall protect the employment and places of employment of his employees engaged in a longshoring operation
... by complying with the appropriate standards prescribed in this paragraph. (emphasis added)
89. See cases cited in note 47, supra.
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Ninth Circuit's disregard of the principles established in Scindia
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge Fletcher, as she has previously done in the Subingsubing90 and Bueno91 decisions,
stretches the Scindia holding to new limits in order to find
against the vessel owner.92
In Ollestad, Justice Powell's worst fears come true. By redefining the "risk"98 and finding yet another affirmative duty to
place upon the shipowner,94 Judge Fletcher ignores the real
question of the vessel owner's right to rely upon the stevedore to
avoid obvious hazards and approves the use of a jury instruction
which essentially compels vessel liability whenever the shipowner knew or should have known of an "unreasonable risk"
onboard the vessel where that "risk" causes injury to a longshoreman. 96 The defendant's proposed instruction which more
properly states the rule enunciated in Scindia was rejected by
the court.98
Ironically, Taylor was decided just two months prior to Ollestad. 97 The court in that instance relied heavily upon the shipowners right to rely upon the stevedore to protect the longshoremen from hazards. 98 While the Taylor case dealt with cargo and
not equipment of the vessel,99 the logic remains the same: the
90.
91.
92.
93.

682
687
See
See

F.2d 779.
F.2d 318.
notes 46, 82 and accompanying text, supra.
note 74, supra.

94. [d.

95. See note 71, supra.
96. [d.
97. Interestingly, Judge J. Blaine Anderson authored Taylor and sat on the panel in
Ollestad.
98. See notes 56 and 57, supra.
99. The Taylor court stated: "The scope of the shipowner's duty as set forth in
Scindia focuses on the character of the ship and its equipment-not the nature of the
cargo." 739 F.2d at 1386.
The court later states, however:
Even if the shipowner had knowledge of the beans' invasion of
the winch platform (a part of the vessel) it would not necessarily follow . . . that the beans created a sufficiently high risk
of harm to require intervention in the cargo operation by the
shipowner. . .. In light of custom, regulation, and case law
. . . it was reasonable for the shipowner to expect the stevedore to do what was necessary to maintain a safe place for the
longshoremen to work.
[d. at 1388.
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condition (be it a misplaced boom rest or torn sacks of beans)
does not become an unreasonable risk and create a danger to
longshoremen until the stevedore fails to take appropriate precautions in the course of the operation. It is only when the stevedore's actions or inaction become known to the vessel owner and
are said to be "obviously improvident" is a duty to remedy the
hazard placed upon the shipowner. loo
In Ollestad, the "risk" was said to be the crews placement
of the boom rest and hatch cover. The stevedore, however, obviously did not feel that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one. 101 The longshore crew had used the weather deck the
morning of the injury to get to and from their work areas and
plaintiff himself had climbed over the boomrest several times
prior to the accident. The accumulation of snow and ice on the
deck during the loading operation contributed to the creation of
an apparently hazardous condition. Nonetheless, unless the stevedore acted improvidently in proceeding with his work despite
the existence of this hazard, and the vessel owner had knowledge
that the stevedore would not or could not avoid the hazard, the
vessel owner had no obligation to intervene and remedy the
situation.
Judge Fletcher in Ollestad relies upon her Bueno decision
to support the conclusion that the ships placement of the boom
rest and hatch cover, prior to turning the vessel over, subjected
them to the same duties and responsibilities owed by a stevedore
to its longshore employees. l02 Under this rationale, the shipowner would be required, contrary to Scindia, to continually inspect and supervise the cargo operations and otherwise comply
with OSHA Regulations. los Even in the Bueno decision, which
also misapplies Scindia, the affirmative duty allegedly assumed
by defendants included inspections during the sandblasting op100. This test is essentially the same test set out in Scindia for hazards arising during the cargo operation, except that where the condition exists from the commencement
of the operation, knowledge of the condition is presumed. See note 80, supra.
101. In Taylor, by comparison, the testimony revealed that the stevedore superintendent had walked through the loose beans and did not consider them to be hazardous.
739 F.2d at 1388.
102. 738 F.2d at 1052.
103. In Ollestad, the court stated: "Where the ship undertakes work normally performed by a longshoreman, OSHA standards regulating such work are relevant to the
jury's consideration of whether the ship exercised reasonable care." Id. at 1053.
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eration in which the plaintiff was taking part. In Ollestad the
condition existed at the time the vessel was turned over to the
stevedore. It was an open and obvious condition which the shipowner could reasonably anticipate would be avoided by the experienced stevedore. Indeed, since it was thought to be a normal
stevedore function to move the hatch cover and boom rest, it
was within the stevedore's capability to relocate them if the
safety of longshoremen required their relocation. l04
It is well established that if a vessel owner exercises "active
control" over the areas involved in the cargo operation or becomes "actively involved" in a loading or unloading process, the
vessel may be subject to liability for its negligence. 1011 Unless it
can be maintained that there is some active involvement or control during the cargo operations, it would seem logical that the
vessel owner cannot be saddled with additional affirmative duties. l06 The Taylor panel recognized this axiom and rejected its
application when it held that the sweeping of the deck by the
ship's crew did not rise to the type of "active control" required
by Scindia. 107 It is hard to imagine how an activity performed by
the vessel's crew before the vessel was turned over to the stevedore could create such active involvement, unless custom or contract so provide. l08

Judge Fletcher distinguishes Scindia as being a case where
the negligence arose after the cargo operations began. loe This is
simply not the case, for the triable issue of fact in Scindia was
whether the shipowner had actual knowledge of the defect in the
winch or was chargeable with knowledge because the winch was
104. The court noted in Ollestad that: "Before the longshoremen came on board,
the ship's crew uncovered the hatches and stacked the hatch covers on the weather deck,
a job normally performed by longshoremen." Id. at lO50.
105. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167.
106. For example, in Taylor, the court stated: "By assuming the responsibility for
cleaning up the original spillage on the deck, the vessel will not be obligated to a continuous duty to clean up additional spillage resulting from the stevedore's failure to properly discharge the cargo." 739 F.2d at 1388.
107. In Taylor, the court held: "The active control over the area or equipment utilized in the cargo operation is distinct from the casual use of the deck by the ship's crew
for passage or activities undertaken by the crew at the specific request of stevedore personnel." Id. at 1387.
108. The Supreme Court in Scindia indicated that contract, positive law, or custom
could modify the vessel's duty. 451 U.S. at 172.
lO9. Ollestad, 738 F.2d at lO52.
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defective from the outset. 110 The defendant in Ollestad was entitled to have its proposed jury instruction read to the jury. The
legal duties placed on the stevedore and the vessel's justifiable
expectations that these duties be performed are necessary considerations in determining if a shipowner has breached its duty
to the longshoremen. 111
The Ollestad decision not only ignores the vessel owner's
right to rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to obvious hazards but goes further to impress upon the
shipowner the legal duties required of the stevedore by the Occupational Health and Safety Act. The stevedore is put in the
envious position of being able to rely upon the shipowner to
provide for the longshoremen's safety. This result thwarts the
intent of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA which were intended to encourage the safety of longshoremen. 1l2 Under any
stretch of the law, the stevedore is primarily responsible for ensuring the safety of its employees since it is in the best position
to remedy hazards. lls
Courts in other circuits have taken more realistic approaches to preexisting obvious conditions on vessels which are
more in line with the principles established in Scindia. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Bonds v. Mortensen and Lange,1l4
1l0. 451 U.S. 178.
1l1. The court in Scindia stated:
As we have indicated, the legal duties placed on the stevedore
and the vessel's justifiable expectations that those duties will
be performed are relevant in determining whether the shipowner has breached its duty. The trial court and, where appropriate, the jury, should thus be made aware of the scope of
the stevedore's duty under the positive law.
451 U.S. at 176.
1l2. See Scindia, [d. at 163, n. 13.
1l3. [d. at 181 (Powell concurring).
114. 717 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1983) (per Field; other members of the panel were Russell and Ervin). In Bonds, a longshoreman was fatally injured when crushed by a moving
gantry crane on board defendant's vessel. The warning bell on the gantry crane was either not working or was inaudible at the time of the accident, and the crane was so
designed that the operator could not see anything in the vicinity of the crane legs. In a
bench trial, the district court found both the longshoreman and the stevedore to be without fault, and adjudged the shipowner to be liable based on a conclusion that the malfunctioning bell and the ship's design, taken in tandem, constituted the proximate cause
of the accident. The court of appeals reversed, holding that since the malfunctioning bell
and ship's design were open and obvious, the shipowner was entitled to rely upon the
stevedore's judgment that the cargo operations could safely be undertaken. The steve-
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held that a malfunctioning gantry crane bell coupled with an alleged defect in ship's design, being open and obvious to all, entitled the vessel owner to rely upon the stevedore's judgment as to
whether discharge operations could safely be undertaken.n~
That court concluded that it was only where the conduct of the
stevedore or longshoremen, known to the shipowner, was obviously improvident that the vessel owner had a duty to intervene
to protect the longshoremen. H6 While the lower court specifically found the stevedore and longshoremen acted reasonably in
proceeding with cargo operations in light of the alleged hazard,
the court stated that even if they found the longshoremen failed
to act reasonably, the result would be the same since it was not a
case where the shipowner should have anticipated that the stevedore could not avoid the dangerous condition.l17
A recent district court decision in the Fifth Circuit interprets Scindia in a similar fashion. H8 In Harrington v. U.S.
Lines, H9 the court held that the vessel owner may have a duty to
dore's judgment in proceeding under the circumstances was not "obviously improvident," since the district court found it to be without fault. Therefore, the shipowner had
no duty to intervene and stop the cargo operations. 717 F.2d at 128.
115. [d. at 127-28.
116. [d. at 128.
117. The court stated:
Even assuming, contrary to the District Court's finding of fact,
that Bonds and other longshoremen failed to exercise reasonable care by standing near the gantry crane legs during discharge operations, this is not a case in which the shipowner
should have anticipated that the stevedore could not avoid the
dangerous condition. (Citations omitted) This is not a situation, then, in which the longshoremen were precluded from
performing their tasks except by a means that was inherently
dangerous. (Citations omitted)
[d. at 128 n.5.
118. Harrington v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 587 F.Supp. 239 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (Black, S.,
District Judge).
119. In Harrington, the longshoreman was injured when he fell while descending
into a hatch on defendant's vessel while attempting to close the doors on a cargo
container. The open doors had prevented the stevedore from removing the container
from the hatch. The district court, finding that the condition was one which arose prior
to the vessel being turned over to the stevedore, held that the unsecured container door
was not a defect subjecting the defendant to liability. Unsecured container doors are
commonly encountered in cargo operations and are to be anticipated by the stevedore.
The court further held that even if the unsecured doors were a defect, there would be no
duty to warn the stevedore of this condition, since it was obvious or to be anticipated by
him. Since the vessel owner is in the least effective position to intervene and correct the
defect, it is entitled to rely upon the stevedore to do so. [d. at 241.
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correct a defect or condition he knows 'exists at the commencement of the cargo operation when the defect creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen and he knows that he
cannot rely on the stevedore to protect the longshoremen from
that risk. 120 The existence of an unsecured container door in
that case did not constitute a "risk" or "hazard" to the longshoremen beyond that normally encountered in the unloading of
a vessel. 121 Even if they did constitute a defect, the court stated
that the shipowner would not be responsible for warning the stevedore and longshoremen since unsecured container doors are a
common occurrence and were to be anticipated by the stevedore. 122 Further, the condition did not create an "unreasonable
risk of harm" requiring shipowner intervention because of the
stevedore and longshoremen's awareness of these conditions. u3
Certainly, the fact that a condition is "open and obvious"
does not in and of itself relieve the vessel owner from liability.124
It does, however, serve to establish that the stevedore is aware
or should be aware of the condition. As such, it goes to establish
the reasonableness of the shipowners reliance on the stevedore
to protect the longshoremen against the danger and eliminate
any need for the shipowner to warn the longshoremen of the
danger. There will be situations where the danger will be such
that the shipowner could not reasonably expect the stevedore to
correct or avoid the danger to the longshoremen or where the
stevedores decision to proceed in light of the condition known to
the shipowner is so unreasonable as to require intervention. In
those circumstances the vessel owner has a duty to remedy the
condition.
The theory of limited vessel owner liability enunciated in
Scindia, recognizes the justifiable expectations of the vessel that
the stevedore will perform with reasonable competence and see
to the safety of the cargo operations. Merely finding both the
vessel and the stevedore concurrently negligent in various per120. Id. at 242.
121. Id. at 245.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. A shipowner cannot defend on the grounds that the longshoreman should have
refused to work in the face of an obviously dangerous condition. See Scindia. 451 U.S. at
176. n. 22.
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centages is of no practical effect,12II and negates the vessel's right
to rely upon the stevedore. It cannot be argued that this standard of care incorporates concepts of assumption of the risk or
contributory negligence on the part of the longshoremen which
was the dispute with the Restatement §343 standard. 126 While it
does necessarily impute concepts of contributory negligence on
the part of the stevedore,127 the focus is not upon the longshoreman's negligence. In fact, the focus is not even upon the stevedore's negligence (although negligence would probably be present if the longshoreman was injured because of the stevedores
failure to avoid the hazard) but rather upon the vessel's reasonableness in relying upon an expert stevedore. To that extent, the
issue can probably be decided through expert witnesses and the
use of OSHA regulations. In most cases, bifurcation might be
appropriate,128 where questions of fact preclude summary
judgment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judge Fletcher's decision in Ollestad reflects the continuing
desire of various panels of the Ninth Circuit to subject the shipowner to liability for the stevedore's negligence. In enacting the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress clearly intended to
terminate the vessel's automatic, faultless responsibility for conditions caused by the negligence or other defaults of the stevedore. u9 Vessel liability is said to be the exception and not the
rule. ISO The longshoremen have legislatively lost the benefit of
liberal judgments against vessel owners in return for the higher
compensation benefits incorporated into the 1972 amendments.
125. See text accompanying note 82, supra.
126. See, for example, Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., AlS, 435 F.Supp. 484, 49395 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
127. Applying the concept of "superceding causation" to the stevedore's negligence
is attractive in this instance. See Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 C.2d 688 (1936). This
theory, however, would not apply when the stevedore's negligence reaches the point
where it becomes obviously improvident, and a vessel owner with knowledge has a duty
to intervene.
128. Bifurcation under FRCP 42(b) would seem appropriate in this instance, since
this single issue could be dispositive of the vessel's liability and would undoubtedly avoid
prejudice to a "deep pocket" shipowner.
129. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 165, n. 12.
130. In Bandeen v. United Carriers, the court stated: "It is the exceptional case
under Scindia that the shipowner remains liable as a "deep pocket" defendant, when it
turns the vessel over to the stevedore." 712 F.2d at 1341.
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The Ninth Circuit in Ollestad, however, persists in expanding vessel liability contrary to the intent of the 1972
amendments and the guidelines set down in Scindia. Certain
panels in this Circuit have refused to recognize that the Supreme Court, while affirming the reversal of summary judgment
in Scindia by the Ninth Circuit, disapproved of its "general reasonableness" standard. l3l The court in Taylor, however, appears
to reestablish the significance of the shipowners right to rely
upon the stevedore and the limited scope of the shipowners duty
to longshoremen for obvious hazards on board the vessel.
Taylor represents only the second reported decision of the
Ninth Circuit which in any way limits the vessel owners duty to
longshoremen, subsequent to the Scindia decision. 132 It is the
only reported decision since Scindia in this Circuit which emphasizes the shipowner's right to rely upon the stevedore with
respect to open and obvious hazards. It is hoped that Taylor is
indicative of a shift away from the direction previously taken by
the Ninth Circuit. The change in course is welcomed and hopefully will result in a more consistent and uniform application of
the principles established in Scindia.

131. In Dugas v. C. Brower, 85 D.A.R. 828 (March 5, 1985), a California appellate
court's holding exemplifies the confusion engendered by the Ninth Circuit's conflicting
opinions. Relying on Subingsubing, the court erroneously observed that a negligent shipowners liability may be reduced but not eliminated by the negligence of the stevedore or
longshoreman.
132. See also Bandeen, 712 F.2d 1336.
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CHEVRON U.S.A. v. HAMMOND:
STATE CONTROL OF
OIL TANKER DEBALLASTING

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Hammond,! the Ninth Circuit
held that Alaska's deballasting statute 2 was not preempted by
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act3 nor by the Coast Guard
1. 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
Alarcon, J. and Nelson, J.).
2. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, a person may
not cause or permit the discharge of ballast water from a cargo
tank of a tank vessel into the waters of the state. A tank vessel
may not take on petroleum or a petroleum product or byproduct as cargo unless it arrives in ports in the state without
having discharged ballast from cargo tanks into the waters of
the state and the master of the vessel certifies that fact on
forms provided by the department.
(b) The master of a tank vessel may discharge ballast
water from a cargo tank of his tank vessel if it is necessary for
the safety of the tank vessel and no alternative action is feasible to assure the safety of the tank vessel.
ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(e) (1976), amended by ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(a}-(b) (1980),
hereinafter cited as Alaska Statute.
3. Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended by the Ports
and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 (PWSA/PTSA), in pertinent part, is as follows:
(a) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,
equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels to
which this chapter applies, that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and property, for
navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of
the marine environment. . .Regulations prescribed under this
subsection shall include requirements about(7) the reduction or elimination of discharges during
ballasting, deballasting, tank cleaning, cargo handling,
or other such activity.
46 U.S.C. § 3703 (1983). (Formerly 46 U.S.C. § 391a(6)(A)).
(b)(1) An existing crude oil tanker of at least 40,000 deadweight tons shall be equipped with(A) segregated ballast tanks; or
(B) a crude oil washing system.
46 U.S.C. § 3705 (1983). (Formerly 46 U.S.C. § 391a(7)(0)).
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regulations 4 authorized by the Act.1i
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., brought suit in U.S. district courtS
challenging the constitutionality of the Alaska Tanker Act. 7 The
The court interpreted the pre-1983 codification of the PWSA!PTSA § 391a. In August of 1983 Congress revised portions of Title 46, including § 391a, which was repealed
and superseded by Revised Title 46 (Supp. 1984). See Title 46 Shipping Laws Partial
Revision Pamphlet (1983). The new sections have retained most of the same wording
found in the old sections.
The purpose of the partial revision of Title 46 was to make the law easier to administer, less cumbersome to use, and more understandable for everyone. H.R. REP. No. 98338, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD NEWS 924, 925.
4. The PWSA!PTSA gives the Coast Guard, through the Secretary of Transportation, the authority to regulate deballasting. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(7)(1983). The Coast
Guard has exercised this authority by promulgating regulations; see 33 C.F.R. §§
157.03(e), 157.09, 157.10, 157.1l(a)-(c), 157.25 - 157.49.
(a)Not later than June I, 1981, except as allowed in paragraph (b) [70,000 deadweight tons or more with a certain construction) of this section, existing vessel of 40,000 DWT [deadweight tons) or more that carries crude oil and a new vessel of
40,000 DWT or more but less than 70,000 DWT that carries
.
crude oil must have
(1) Segregated ballast tanks ... ; or
(2) A crude oil washing system that meets the design,
equipment, and installation requirements of Subpart D of this
part.
33 C.F.R. § 157.10a (1980).
(a) Except as required in paragraph (b) of this section, a
tank vessel may discharge into the sea an oily mixture from a
cargo tank ... if the vessel
(1) Is more than 50 nautical miles from nearest land;
(2) Is proceeding en route;
(3) Is discharging at an instantaneous rate of oil content
not exceeding 60 liters per nautical mile;
(4) Is an existing vessel and the total quantity of oil discharged into the sea does not exceed 1/15,000 of the total
quantity of the cargo that the discharge formed a part, or is a
new vessel and the total quantity of oil discharged into the sea
does not exceed 1/30,000 of the total quantity of the cargo
that the discharge formed a part . . . .
33 C.F.R. § 157.37.
"(a) Clean ballast may be discharged in accordance with § 157.37(a)(6)." 33 C.F.R. §
157.43 (1976).
5. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1983) (Formerly 46 U.S.C. § 391a (6)(A)), supra note 3; 726
F.2d 483, 501.
6. The action originated in the District Court for the District of Alaska. In December of 1977, Intercontinental Bulktank, et al., intervened. In December of 1981, Cordova
Fisheries Union, et al., were joined in the action as defendants - intervenors.
7. Supra note 2. The Alaska Tanker Laws include the deballasting statute as well as
other tanker design and operational provisions. Id. During the litigation and after the
Supreme Court held that the PWSA/PTSA preempted state laws concerning design and
construction of tankers, Ray V. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), appellants
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district court held that the statute was invalid because it was
preempted by Coast Guard regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and its
amendments. 8
Defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing that the
state law was not preempted because Congress had no intent to
occupy the entire field of water pollution caused by oil tanker
deballasting and the statute was consistent with the federal statutory scheme and related international conventions to which the
United States was a party.9
II. BACKGROUND

A.

The PWSA/PTSA

Congress enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
(PWSA) in 1972 in an effort to control the environmental
hazards of oil tanker navigation in U.S. waters.lO The Act contains provisions which set minimum standards for tanker design,
safety, operation, traffic control, and pollution. l l
The Ports and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA) was enacted in
1978 to amend the PWSA.12 The amendment was adopted because there was a need for more stringent design controls and
operating standards than originally were required by the
PWSA.18
stipulated to the invalidity of most of the provisions of the Alaska Tanker Act, and appealed only the decision concerning ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(e) and its amendments.
(Appellants Brief at 1-4, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hamond, 726 F.2d 483.).
8. 726 F.2d at 485.
9. See generally, Appellants Brief, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.Hamond, 726 F.2d 483.
10. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-340 §§ WI, 102, 86
Stat. 424-31 (1972) (Prior to 1978 Amendments of the PTSA).
11. Id. Title I of the Act focuses on traffic control and Title II of the Act focuses on
vessel safety and protection of the marine environment through vessel design, construction, and operational requirements. See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,
161 (1978).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978) (Codified at 46 U.S.C. § § 391a, repealed and superseded by Revised Title 46 (Supp. 1984). See Title 46 Shipping Laws
Partial Revision Pamphlet (1983».
13. Pub. L. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471, 1481 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 3270, 3270-71. The PWSA's standards for vessel design and safety needed to
be more stringent and comprehensive to mitigate the hazards to life, property, and the
marine environment. Id.
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The PWSA/PTSA authorized the Coast Guard to regulate
deballasting. H Under 33 C.F.R. §§ 157.37, et. seq., tankers are
prohibited from deballasting oil cargo tanks within fifty miles of
shore. However, under certain circumstances "clean ballast"
may be discharged. Iii
The PWSA/PTSA and the accompanying Coast Guard regulations are based upon the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 (MARPOL) and the
1978 Protocol entitled International Conference on Tanker
Safety and Pollution Prevention (MARPOL Protocol).16
The goal of MARPOL was to completely eliminate international pollution of the marine environment by oil and to minimize the incidents of accidental oil discharges. I7 Approximately
2.5 million tons of oil per year pollute the oceans of the world
because of maritime accidents and vessel operational discharges. Is Deballasting is an operational discharge. After unload14. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), supra note 3. The PWSA/PTS~ authorizes the Secretary to
issue appropriate regulations to implement the policies of the Act. Pursuant to this authority, Coast Guard regulations were promulgated at 33 C.F.R. §§ 157.03-157.49.
15. 33 C.F.R. § 157.43(a); supra note 4. Clean ballast is defined as ballast that:
(e) ... if discharged from a vessel that is stationary into
clean, calm water on a clear day, would not (1) Produce visible traces of oil on the surface of the
water or on adjoining shorelines; or
(2) Cause a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath
the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines.
33 C.F.R. § 157.03 (1980). The "clean ballast" exception is based upon the 1969 Amendments to the 1954 International Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1004 (1976). Though this section was repealed and
superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (1982) (enabling legislation of the MARPOL the
exception survived and was incorporated into 33 C.F.R. § 157.03(e).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 4849, 4850-51. Though the 1973 Convention (MARPOL) was never ratified
by the United States, the Protocol of 1978 incorporated many provisions of the earlier
Convention, including the prohibition of discharge of oily mixtures within 50 miles of the
nearest land. This provision is incorporated in the Coast Guard regulations under the
PWSA/PTSA; 33 C.F.R. § 157.37(a). The 1973 Convention was based in large part upon
the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil and
its amendments. Id.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 4849, 4850-51. See also, Mensah, International Environmental Law: International Conventions Concerning Oil Pollution at Sea, 8 CASE W. R. J. INT'L L. 110, 117
(1976) (citing fourth preambular paragraph of MARPOL, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF./
WP. 35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973)).
18. Kindt, Marine Pollution and Hydrocarbons: The Goal of Minimizing Damage
to the Marine Environment, 14 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 238, 246 (1984). Approximately 50%
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ing, tankers must take on ballast to guarantee the vessel's stability in navigation. In the case of oil tankers, the ballast is stored
in the vessel's oil compartments. As a result, the ballast mixes
with the oil residue and upon deballasting, the oily mixture is
discharged into the sea. 19 The 1973 Convention, MARPOL, addressed this problem by requiring certain sizes of new tankers to
be equipped with segregated ballast tanks 20 and by requiring the
increased use of on-shore reception facilities for ballast discharges. 21 MARPOL incorporated many provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil of 1954 and its amendments, such as the prohibition of
oily mixture discharges within 50 miles of shore and the "clean
ballast" exception now found in the Coast Guard regulations of
the PWSA/PTSA.22
After a series of tanker accidents in or near the waters of
the United States during 1976-77,23 the 1978 Protocol, modifying
MARPOL safety and pollution standards for oil tankers, was
adopted by Congress. 24 The Protocol recognized the need for
of all oil consumed in the world is transported by sea. One·tenth of one percent of this
oil enters the ocean each year. In 1970, five million tons of oil entered the ocean. In 1975,
that number increased to six million tons. Out of approximately 2.5 million tons of oil
per year entering the ocean, vessel operational discharges or deballasting make up 85%
of this figure. See, H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4849, 4851.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD NEWS 4849, 4851. Ballast is seawater used to fill the empty cargo tanks of a vessel
for stabilization purposes. "Ballasting" is the term generally used to describe the process
by which a vessel takes on this seawater.
20. 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 118, (1976). New tankers of between 40,000 70,000 deadweight tons (DWT) were required to be built with segregated ballast tanks.
This provision is now incorporated in 33 C.F.R. § 157.lOa(a). See supra note 4.
21. MARPOL, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONFIWP. 35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973).
22. See supra note 15; See also, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 118 (1976). The 1954
Convention and its amendments are codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1006, repealed and
superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (the enabling legislation for the MARPOL Protocol of 1978).
23. Pub. L. 95-474, 92 Stat. 147l (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 3270, 3274-75. As oil importing and tanker movement in U.S. waters increased,
ship accidents increased. In 1976 there was a rash of tanker accidents. For example, in
December of 1976, the Sansinena, a Liberian tank vessel, had an explosion and fire while
taking on ballast and fuel oil at an oil terminal in the Los Angeles Harbor. Eight people
were killed and fifty others injured. The vessel suffered a total loss and the harbor was
polluted with fuel oil. [d.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CONGo & AD.
NEWS 4849, 4850-52; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (enabling legislation for the 1978 MARPOL
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abating or minimizing oil pollution from ships. The federal legislation enacting the Protocol incorporated and superseded the Oil
Pollution Act Amendments (OPAA) of 1973211 which itself had
adopted and modified the tanker safety and design standards
outlined in the 1954 Convention and its amendments. 26 The
1978 PTSA envisions goals similar to those in the 1978
Protocol. 27

B.

The CZMA And The FWPCA

The Coastal Zone Management Act 28 (CZMA) enacted in
1972, deals with marine environmental protection within the
coastal waters of states. 29 The purpose of the Act is to give federal assistance to states for development programs that preserve
and restore the resources of the coastal zone. 30 Many states have
utilized federal funds through the CZMA to create such programs in the areas of wetland and beach preservation and management of floodplains; the states having complete authority
over the control of these programs and the use of their territorial
waters. Sl
Legislation dealing specifically with water pollution is the
Federal Water Pollution Control ActS2 (FWPCA). The intent of
the FWPCA was to protect our nation's waters from pollution. ss
Protocol). While MARPOL was never ratified, the Protocol was. Id.
25. Pub. L. NO. 93·119, §§ 2(1)-(7), 87 Stat. 424, 424·26 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
1001·1006, repealed and superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901·1911 (1982) (enabling legisla·
tion for the MARPOL Protocol».
26. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3·4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 4849, 4849·50; See supra note 22.
27. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3·4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4849 with the purposes of the PWSA as set out in Pub. L. 92·
340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972) and the PTSA codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391a, repealed and super·
seded by Revised Title 46 (Supp. 1984). See supra note 12.
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451·1464 (1982).
29.Id.
30. S. REP. No. 753, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess._, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 4776, 4776 "[The] main purpose is the encouragement and assistance of states in
preparing and implementing management programs to preserve, protect, develop and
wherever possible restore the resources of the coastal zone of the United States." Id.
31. [d. The Senate reported: "There is no attempt to diminish state authority
through federal preemption. The intent of this legislation is to enhance state authority
by encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and regulatory powers over
their coastal zones." Id. See also Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource Man·
agement: A Pragmatic Perspective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 628·29, note 17.
32. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1241·1376 (1982) (commonly know as the Clean Water Act (CWA».
33. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess._, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo &
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The Act was amended in 194834 and again substantially in 1972
to create more cooperation between the federal government and
the states in developing a national program for water pollution
control and abatement. 311 The 1972 amendments to the Act
called for elimination of the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985,36 and more federal-state balance in the permit system. 37 The amendments completely restructured the previous standards set out in earlier amendments 38 and place
primary responsibility on the states for administering the water
pollution program in compliance with the federal guidelines set
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).39
The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA incorporated provisions of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 197040 (WQIA)
AD. NEWS 3668, 3669. Previously there had been little effort to control water pollution on
a national level. [d.
34. [d.
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)(FWPCA). The 1956 amendments to the Act
called for a federal-state partnership in fighting water pollution and authorized federal
grants to assist states in their water pollution plans and to build treatment facilities. The
FWPCA of 1965 required states to develop standards for water pollution control within
their borders but only pertaining to interstate navigable waters. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668, 3669. The
1972 amendments called for the restoration of a federal-state effort in abating or controlling water pollution; "It is the Committee's intent to restore the balance of Federal-State
effort in the program as contemplated by the 1965 and 1966 Acts." [d. at 3675.
36. S. REP No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3674. The Committee believed that a total elimination of water pollution
was essential to restore the "natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." [d. See also the enabling legislation to the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(1). "Navigable waters" is defined as, "waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982).
37. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 3668, 3675. "It is the Committee's intent to restore the balance of FederalState effort in the program as .contemplated by the 1965 and 1966
Acts ... particularly... in the discharge permit system ... " [d.
38. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 1 Leg. History 349-50, comments of
Chairman Blatnik. Compare the 1956 amendments with 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
39. [d. at 359, comments of Rep. Jones: "[Tlhis legislation places primary responsibility for administering the water pollution program within the separate states, with the
firm stipulation that each State must comply with the ...guidelines set by the Environmental Protection Agency." [d. The enabling legislation to the FWPCA also contains
this reference: "It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). States may set more stringent standards than the federal
law but not standards below the federal minimum. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
40. Pub. L. NO. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 862 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982). "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United
States that there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the
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prohibiting the discharge of oil into navigable waters and adjoining shorelines. 41 As the WQIA prescribed, the FWPCA now imposes strict liability for clean-up costs after an oil spill when
there are found to be acts of negligence or willful misconduct. 42
In EPA v. California State Water Resources Control
Board,43 the Supreme Court held that the EPA has authority
over states to issue permits under the FWPCA and to approve a
state's permit program." The court, however, noted that the
FWPCA allows states to set higher standards for water pollution
than what may have been set by the EPA pursuant to federal
law. 4Ci
In Pacific Legal Foundation u. Costle,46 the Ninth Circuit
held that while the FWPCA extended permitting authority primarily to the states, only the EPA administrator has authority
to grant permits for pollutant discharges into the area beyond
the territorial seas. 47 However, the court stated that Congress
supported a federal-state coordinated effort to effect the goals of
the FWPCA,4S and that this was a sensible way to deal with the
jurisdictional problems created by the Act's permitting
authority.49
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of
the contiguous zone . . . . " 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1).
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(1), 1362(7) (1982).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1982). See also Guss, Interaction of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act with the Limitation of Liability Act and the General Maritime
Law, 6 MAR. LAW 199, 201 (1981).
43. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
44. Id. at 214-15.
45. Id. at 218-20.
46. 586 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 198 (1980).
47. Id. at 655. The court supports its holding by referring to the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b) which says in part, "[T)he Governor of each State desiring to administer its
own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may
submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the program it proposes
to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact . . . . " [emphasis added). Since the definition of navigable waters excludes the contiguous zone and
the ocean, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982) (supra note 36) the Administrator under the
FWPCA must have exclusive permitting authority over areas within U.S. jurisdiction but
beyond the territorial seas.
48. 586 F.2d at 657.
49. Id. The jurisdictional problems created by the FWPCA are stated by the court
to be the divided jurisdiction of permitting authority. The state has authority to grant
permits for pollutant discharges within its territorial seas while the Administrator has
exclusive authority beyond the states' territorial seas. Id. See also supra note 47.
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C. Preemption Doctirne
When the state and federal government both regulate a particular subject matter a question may arise as to whether the
state law is preempted by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the
United States Constitution.1IO
In Hines v. Davidowitz,r>l the Supreme Court held that the
Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act of 1939 was void because it
conflicted with the less stringent rules of the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940.r>2 In concluding that the federal law conflicted with the Pennsylvania Act,r>3 the Court stated that an exclusive federal scheme of regulation existed with which states
could not interfere. M The Court's test for determining interference was whether or not a state law could be viewed as an "obstacle" to the full accomplishment of congressional objectives.r>r>
The Court upheld the Hines analysis in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.,r>6 when provisions of the Illinois Public Utilities
Act were found to be preempted by the United States Warehouse Act. r>7 The Court noted that Congress expressly intended
50. The Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, clause 2.
51. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act required aliens who
did not intend to become citizens of the U.S. to register with the state. The law was
enacted to obtain information about aliens within the state territory. Id.
52. Id. at 74. The Pennsylvania Act made the failure to register as an alien a criminal offense while the Federal Act only imposed a criminal penalty upon aliens who willfully failed to register. Id. at 60-61.
53. Id. at 74.
54. Id. at 66-67. The Court found that Congress' Federal Alien Registration Act was
enacted pursuant to its constitutional duty "[t)o establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization." Id. at 66. The Act, being comprehensive in nature, was superior to state laws
which regulated the area.
55. Id. at 67.
56. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Rice brought an action against Santa Fe Elevator Corporation alleging violations of the Illinois Public Utilities Act of 1945. Santa Fe Elevator
Corporation defended on the ground that the United States Warehouse Act, under which
the Corporation's activities were lawful, superseded the state regulation. Id.
57. Id. at 236. The Illinois Public Utilities Act of 1945 related to warehouse licensing. The U.S. Warehouse Act as amended in 1931 preempted the Illinois Act. For an
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that the federal law would apply exclusively to the area of warehouse licensing. ~8
However, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul,~9 the Court applied a harsher preemption test by requiring
a finding either of an unmistakable congressional intent to preempt or, that the compliance with both laws would be a "physical impossibility. "60
This test was further modified in New York Department of
Social Services v. Dublino. 61 The Court refused to find preemption absent a clear and manifest congressional intent. 62 The
Court reasoned that the comprehensive nature of the federal law
in issue is not conclusive evidence of congressional intent63 and
that preemption should not readily be found where federal-state
cooperation would help to effect the congressional purpose of
the law. 6 •
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield

CO.,6~

and Silkwood v. Kerr-

interpretation of Rice and related decisions, from the perspective of how the Supreme
Court determines congressional intent and whether a field is "occupied" by federal legislation, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 625 (1975).
58. Rice, 331 U.S. at 224, 235-36.
59. 373 U.S. 132 (1963). Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. was involved in interstate commerce and sought to enjoin California from enforcing a state statute which
regulated the transportation and sale of avocados in California because the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement of 1937 preempted the more stringent state law.
60. Id. at 142-43. The Court decided that congressional intent to preempt could be
determined from the nature of the subject matter regulated or an express declaration of
Congress. Determining congressional design is not required when following both the state
and federal laws would be a physical impossibility. Id.
61. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). Dublino challenged provisions of the New York Social Welfare Law which required individuals to accept employment before the state would allow
applicants to receive federally funded aid to families with dependant children. The Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN) allocates federal funds for state programs which
provide aid to families with dependent children. Id.
62. Id. at 413, 417.
63. Id. at 415. The federal law in issue was the Federal Work Incentive Program
(WIN) adopted in the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act. States were required
to incorporate WIN into their Aid to Families With Dependent Children Programs
(AFDC - Programs). The state laws sought to be preempted were the 1971 provisions of
the N.Y. Social Welfare Law or New York Work Rules.
64. Id. at 418-20. The Court found that WIN was not a complete and comprehensive
program but really envisioned the states providing supplementary rules to effect the
goals of the federal program.
65. 435 U.S. 151 (1978). Ray is the only case to date decided by the Supreme Court
which interprets the PWSA/PTSA. The case was brought when Atlantic Hichfield Co.
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McGee Corp.,66 the Supreme Court applied a two-part test to
determine whether federal regulations preempted state law: (1)
whether Congress "occupied" a field of law to the extent that
state law preemption was warranted and, if not, (2) whether the
state law was invalid because it "conflicted" with the federal
law. 67

In Ray, the Court held that provisions of the Washington
State Tanker Law were preempted by the PWSA/PTSA because
Congress intended the federal law to completely "occupy" the
field of tanker design and construction due to the need for uniform national standards. 66 However, the provisions of the Washington Law concerning tug escorts69 were not "design specifications" requiring uniform national standards and therefore not
preempted by the PWSA/PTSA.70
In Silkwood, the Court held that the state's remedy for tortious conduct in the area of nuclear safety was not preempted by
the Atomic Energy Act because there was no evidence that Congress intended to "occupy" the field or to bar states from establishing remedies for injuries suffered from exposure to hazardous
substances. 71 In both cases where the particular area of state law
passed the "occupied" test, the Court found no existing
"conflict. "72
challenged the Washington Tanker Laws which regulated tanker design and construction
for tankers entering Puget Sound. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.170-88.16.190 (1974).
66. _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 615 (1984). Silkwood's estate brought an action against
the Kerr-McGee Corporation on behalf of the deceased Karen Silkwood, to recover personal injury damages for radiation exposure to Ms. Silkwood when she worked in the
Corporation's plant in Oklahoma. Id.
67. Id. at 621; Ray, 435 U.S. at 157-58.
68. 435 U.S. at 158-63. 1975, Wash. Laws, 1st Extr. Sess., WASH. REV. CODE §
88.16.170 et seq. (1974)(Tanker Law). The Court distinguished Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) which held that a municipal law regulating air pollution from ships entering its ports was not preempted by federal vessel licensing laws
even though complying with the Detroit ordinance would require ships to be equipped
with smoke abatement devices not otherwise mandated by federal law. The Ray Court
held that the Huron decision was based on the finding that the federal and municipru
laws did not "overlap" in purpose or scope whereas here, the Washington laws were enacted with the same purposes in mind and regulated the same areas as the PWSA/
PTSA. See 435 U.S. at 165.
69. Wash. Rev. Code § 88.16.190 (1974).
70. Ray, 435 U.S. at 179-80.
71. _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. at 622-24.
72. Id. at 626; Ray, 435 U.S. at 173.
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The Supreme Court, as well as the Ninth Circuit, has been
reluctant to apply the preemption doctrine when the possibility
of conflict between the state and federal laws is only speculative. 73 For example, in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,"
it was argued that a Maryland statute prohibiting oil producers
and refiners from operating retail service stations and regulating
temporary price reductions was invalid because it "conflicted"
with the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act. 711 The Court denied the existence of any conflict between
the statutes and noted that the potential for conflict was too
speculative to warrant a finding of preemption. 76
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the preemption doctrine in Morseburg v. Balyon,77 when it held that
the California Resale Royalties Act was not preempted by the
1909 Copyright Act. 78 The court reasoned that "occupation" and
"conflict" are more easily found "when the emphasis is to protect and strengthen national power."79 The court found the cru73. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130·31 (1978) (A Maryland
statute prohibiting oil producers and refiners from entering the retail gas sales market
was not in conflict with the Robinson-Patman Act and the potential for conflict in different situations was too speculative to find preemption; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974) (Ohio's trade secret laws were not preempted by federal
patent laws since there was no great possibility that the state law would conflict with
federal policy in the patent law area; William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1049 (9th Cir. 1981) (The possibility that the California Unfair Practices Act may proscribe conduct that federal antitrust laws permit was
not sufficient to apply preemption).
74. 435 U.S. 117 (1978).
75. Id. at 122, note 5, 129. Exxon argued that the Maryland statute conflicted with §
2(b) of the Clayton act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
which is a goodfaith defense to voluntary allowance of price reductions. However, the
Court held that the § 2(b) defense was not applicable to a situation where the oil company gives its own retailer a reduced price to help the retailer lower prices to meet the
competition. Id. at 129-30. Exxon also argued that state law should be held invalid because it was a violation of the Due Process clause and created an undue burden on interstate commerce. These claims were rejected by the Court. [d. at 131.
76. [d. at 131.
77. 621 F.2d 972, 976-78 (9th Cir. 1980). Morseburg, an art dealer, was required to
pay royalties on paintings he sold pursuant to the California Resale Royalties Act. CAL.
~v. CODE § 986 (Deering's Supp. 1984). Morseburg argued that the California Act was
preempted by the 1909 Copyright Act because the California Act impaired his ability to
sell his "work of fine art" within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act. Morseburg, 621
F.2d at 975.
78. Id. at 978. The 1909 Act does not provide for a resale royalty. The court also
found that a requirement to pay such a royalty does not "impermissibly restrict" the
owner's ability to resell his/her art. Id.
79. Id. at 976. See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
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cial inquiry to be whether the two laws function "harmoniously
rather than discordantly."8o
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit applied the two-part Silkwood test81 in
determining that Alaska's deballasting statute was not preempted by the PWSA/PTSA.82 Considering the first part of the
test, whether Congress intended to "occupy" the field of deballasting, the court found no express congressional intent to do so
within the federal legislation,83 and proceeded to determine
whether such a legislative intent could be implied.
The court first distinguished Ray 8" by finding that there
were significant differences between the subject matter regulated
in Ray and that regulated by the Alaska Tanker Act. The Washington Law regulated tanker design characteristics, while the
Alaska Law challenged on appeal regulated ocean pollutant discharges. 8C1 The court stated that the Ray holding should be limited to preemption of state laws regulating tanker design and
construction. 86
Applying the Rice 87 decision, the court analyzed the legislative intent of the PWSA/PTSA's pollution control provisions
and noted that a state's police powers should not be superseded
by federal legislation unless there is clear congressional intent to
do SO.88 Since the legislative record of the PWSA/PTSA was
void of any congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollutant discharges,89 the court compared it to other federal
marine environmental protection statutes90 to determine
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM L. REV. 623 (1975).
80. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978.
81. _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 615.
82. 726 F.2d at 501.
83. Id. at 486.
84. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
85. Id. at 487-88.
86.Id.
87. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
88. 726 F.2d at 488 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
89. Id. at 489.
90. The court cites the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) and the Marine Protection, Research & Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1982)(MPRSA). MPRSA
regulates pollution dumping beyond the 3 mile territorial seas. The court also cites other
federal acts, including the Deep Water Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1982), giving
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whether it could find an implied intent. Dl
The court analyzed the FWPCA and found it to be evidence
of a congressional policy supporting more stringent state regulation for the protection of the local marine environment. D2 Based
upon this evidence, the court determined that there was no compelling need for uniform national standards in the area of pollutant discharges,D8 unlike the area of tanker design and construction where uniformity is necessary to alleviate conflict among
various ports. D4
The court buttressed their argument by analogizing the
PWSA/PTSA with the OPAA.DII The OPAA approved the 1969
amendments to the 1954 International Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,D8 which prohibited certain
oily mixture discharges within 50 miles of shore. D7 Since the
OPAA contemplated stricter standards being set by states under
the FWPCA,D8 the analogy between the PWSA/PTSA and the
OPAA lead the court to conclude that Congress intended stricter
state standards for oil pollution be enforced within three miles
of shore in addition to the Coast Guard regulations issued under
the PWSA/PTSA.99
the Coast Guard authority over ports beyond the 3 mile territorial seas, and the Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982), which provides assistance for states' Coastal Zone Management Plans. 726 F.2d at 489. See supra note 30, 31.
91. 726 F.2d at 489.
92. Id. at 491. The court found that under the FWPCA states maintain control for
limiting pollution within their jurisdictions. The court stated: "Thus, in the CWA
[FWPCA) Congress has clearly expressed its intent to allow the states to take an active
role in abating water pollution." Id. at 489 (citing Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle, 586
F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 198 (1980).
93. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 726 F.2d at 491.
94. Id. at 492. Relying on Dublino, 413 U.S. at 415, the court rejected the argument
that the comprehensive nature of the PWSA!PTSA evinces federal intent to occupy the
entire field of water pollution discharges and noted that "the legislative history [of the
PWSA!PTSA) ... may stand equally for the proposition that the problem of tanker
caused pollution is complex, must be approached from many angles, and requires a diversity of solutions." Id.
95. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 726 F.2d at 495; Pub. L. 93-119, 87 Stat. 424, codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1006 (1982), repealed and superseded by MARPOL Protocol, supra
note 29. The PTSA is based upon the Protocol, supra note 17, hence the analogy.
96. The U.S. ratified the 1954 Convention and implementing legislation was passed
in 1961. Pub. L. 87-167, 75 Stat. 402 (1961).
97. Supra note 22.
98. 726 F.2d at 494-95 (citing 119 Congo Rec. 14,588, 14,590 (1973».
99. Id. at 495.
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Under the second part of the Silkwood test, the court considered whether the Alaska Statute, on its face or in its purpose,
conflicted with the PWSA/PTSA.loO The court noted that rather
than conflict, the statutes' objectives are compatible. lol Following Exxon,102 the court concluded that where separate legislative
schemes reflect the same goals, courts should be reluctant to infer preemption. l03
Finally, the court rejected the argument posited by Chevron
that following the state law was a ,harsh economic burden not
contemplated by the Federal Act because Alaska's required use
of its on-shore reception facilities was imposed in addition to the
federal requirement that tankers maintain crude oil washing systems. It found that the crude oil washing system was still necessary in ports that did not have on-shore reception facilities for
deballasting. lo, The court also held that the economic burden
did not convert the state requirement into an indirect design
feature which, following Ray, would require preemption. 1011
IV.

CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit is the first court to consider whether the
PWSA/PTSA preempts state law in the area of tanker pollutant
discharges within a state's territorial waters. In holding that the
Federal Act does not preempt state regulations, the court follows
a trend not to find preemption absent clear congressional intent,
and where state and federal laws can function harmoniously.
The court may also be establishing a new trend not to preempt
where uniform national standards are not required based upon
the nature of the activity regulated.
100, [d. at 495-501.
101. [d. at 496.

102. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
103. 726 F.2d at 497 (citing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 132).
104. 726 F.2d at 499-501. Appellees argued that since the usual practice of tankers is
to de ballast beyond 50 miles, clean the tanks with the crude oil washing systems on the
vessel, take on new ballast, and then discharge this "clean ballast" in the port, requiring
tankers to use a port's reception facilities to deballast would make the crude oil washing
systems required by the PWSA!PTSA superfluous and would create a harsh economic
burden. [d.
105, [d. at 500, The court stated: "While this requirement [use of on-shore reception
facilities for deballasting) may impose some financial burden on the regulated vessels
and require their owners to make some economic choices in order to comply, such a
burden neither converts the discharge prohibition into a design feature nor justifies a
finding of federal preemption." See also supra note 70.
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The recent trend to not find preemption where state and
federal law can function concurrently is evidenced by the Dublino,108 Exxon,107 and Morseburg l08 decisions. In all of these
cases the courts looked at the objectives and compatibility of the
state law with the purposes of the federal law!09 The court correctly utilized these decisions to bolster its argument that preemption should not easily be found where the statutes at issue
do not actually conflict and where the goals of both laws are the
same. l1 O
The Ninth Circuit not only finds the federal and state statutes have similar goals in the area of pollutant discharges, III but,
by looking into the federal statutory scheme of water pollution
control, advances the thellry that Congress believed that a federal-state partnership is the best means for controlling water
pollution within a state's territorial waters.ll2
The court properly bases its conclusion of congressional intent upon federal law and international agreements in the area
of water pollution abatement. For example, the Alaska Statute's
requirement that oil tankers utilize on-shore reception facilities
to deballast,113 was the type of requirement contemplated by the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil of 1954,114 and the Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships of 1973, llI! supported by the United
106. See Dublino, 413 U.S. at 418-20. For an analysis of the trend set by Dublino
and other cases see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federal·
ism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM L. REV. 623, 650-53 (1975).
107. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 132.
108. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977.
109. See Dublino, 413 U.S. at 418-20, Exxon, 437 U.S. at 132, and Morseburg, 621
F.2d at 977.
110. 726 F.2d at 487, 496-98.
Ill. Id. at 496-97.
112. Id. at 489-91, 494-95.
113. See supra note 2.
114. Opened for signature May 12, 1954 (1961) 1 U.S.T. 2987, T.I.A.S. NO. 4900,
324 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 18 VIII, reprinted in Mensah, Environmental Law: International
Conventions Concerning Oil Pollution at Sea, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 114 (1976).
The Convention provides that, "States parties to it shall ensure the provision in their
ports of facilities adequate for reception without causing undue delay to ships, of such
residues from oily ballast and tank washing ... " Id.
115. Regulation 15, The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Poilu·
tion from Ships, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP. 35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973).
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States. 1HI Additionally, the FWPCA provisions relating to the
prohibition of oil discharge into U.S. navigable waters and adjoining shorelines ll7 overlap with the goals and policy of the
PWSA/PTSA.1l8
Though cited briefly by the court in a footnote, the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 119 (CZMA) is persuasive evidence
supporting the proposition that Congress has deferred control
and management of the coastal zone to the states. The main
purpose of the Act is to give assistance to states to develop and
implement coastal zone management programs. 120 The intent of
Congress was not to preempt, but to support, state regulation of
the coastal zone. 121
It may be argued that since Congress expressly stated it did
not intend to preempt state regulation in the CZMA, yet failed
to express that same intent directly in the language of the
PWSA/PTSA, Congress must have intended to preempt state
regulation of oil pollution under the PWSA/PTSA.

However, when both Acts are properly read together, it is
clear that what Congress did not express in the PWSA/PTSA is
expressed by Congress in the CZMA and the FWPCA by the
authority given to the states over their territorial waters.
Finally, the court may be establishing a new trend to not
find preemption where the nature of the activity regulated is
such that uniform national standards are not required. The Supreme Court recently advanced this proposition in Ray when it
held that Washington's tug escort provisions did not regulate activity demanding of national standards, and therefore did not
warrant preemption. 122
116. Supra notes 108 and 109.
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(l) (1982).
118. Compare 46 U.S.C. § 391a, repealed and superceded by Revised Title 46 (Supp.
1984). See supra note 12) with 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
119. 726 F.2d at 489, note 7. See supra note 86 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451·1464
(1982».
120. S. REP. No. 753, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess._, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 4776, 4776.
121. [d. See also supra note 31.
122. 435 U.S. at 179 (citing Cooley V. Board of Wardens, 12 HOW. 299 (1852».
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At least within the confines of the PWSA/PTSA, the Ninth
Circuit correctly expanded this proposition to hold that oil pollutant discharges within state territorial waters is not the kind
of activity which requires uniform national standards. 123 It is not
a "design characteristic" which the Ray court said requires uniform national treatment,l24 but is more akin to a tug escort provision amenable to state regulation where otherwise not in conflict with the Coast Guard regulations. 1211
V.

CONCLUSION

In order to arrive at its decision, the Ninth Circuit interpreted various federal laws and international agreements regarding ocean pollution control that together comprise a federal statutory scheme providing for federal-state coordination in marine
environmental protection.
In the future, courts should adhere to the Ninth Circuit's
opinion and view marine environmental protection as an area in
need of federal-state partnership. Members of industry, state,
and federal government should work together in seeking solutions to the problem of oil pollution.
Michelle T. Leighton*

123. 726 F.2d at 491.
124. 435 U.S. at 171.
125. 435 U.S. at 179-80. "[A) tug escort provision is not a design requirement, such
as is promulgated under Title II [of the PWSA/PTSA). It is more akin to an operating
rule arising from the peculiarities of local waters... c1early within the reach of the Secretary's authority under [Title I) ... [which) merely authorizes and does not require the
Secretary to issue regulations . . . . " [d. at 171. The Ray Court found that there was no
exercise of that authority and therefore held valid the tug escort provisions of the Washington statute. [d.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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